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Pension Fiduciaries and Climate Change:
A Canadian Perspective
Maziar Peihani*
Climate change has emerged as a major issue of financial risk for Canadian pension funds when
determining where to place investments. The author argues that while such pension funds recognize
climate change as an issue that holds the potential for significant financial risk, the funds’ current
approach to climate-related risks faces critical limitations. The author identifies the current practices of
the five largest pension funds in Canada when faced with climate-related financial risks, then discusses
the key shortcomings in current practices among the pension funds in three main areas.
First, the author examines organizational governance, which seeks to understand investment
policies and guidelines related to climate risk, as well as the involvement of senior management and the
pensions’ boards of directors in guiding their funds in the face of these risks. Second, the author considers
the funds’ strategy and risk management, which encompasses any specific climate strategies adopted
by the pension funds, as well as any tools or metrics used to manage and mitigate climate-related
financial risk. Third, the author canvasses pension funds’ engagement and advocacy, which includes
any stewardship practices that monitor or seek to improve the climate practices of investee companies.
The author concludes by discussing the remaining challenges to pension funds and defining a path
forward. The remaining challenges are approached by comparing Canadian funds to their international
peers’ approaches to climate-related financial risk, and by examining the position of Canadian pension
funds within Canada’s wider climate policy implementing the Paris Agreement. The author defines the
path forward for pension funds as requiring a strong policy signal from government that could accelerate
their transition to investments promoting the low-carbon economy.
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Introduction
In December 2015, 195 countries reached the landmark Paris Agreement to
limit global warming to no more than 2°C above pre-industrial levels and even
aspired to bring the global temperature increase below 1.5°C.1 This historic
commitment was made in recognition of the catastrophic consequences of
climate change, such as rising sea levels, forest fires, droughts, and forced
migration. Indeed, the number of climate-related disasters has already doubled
in the past twenty years, with the economic losses increasing from USD 895
billion in the 1978–1997 period to USD 2.3 trillion in the 1998–2017 period.2
The practical implication of the Paris Agreement is that greenhouse gas (GHG)
emissions must be brought down to net zero before the end of the century, and
likely before 2070 so that global warming is limited to 2°C.3 The latest scientific
research also suggests that the worst effects of climate change cannot be avoided

1.  See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), “The Paris
Agreement” (last visited 13 February 2019), online: UNFCCC <unfccc.int/process-andmeetings/the-paris-agreement/the-paris-agreement>.
2.  See United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, “Economic Losses, Poverty &
Disasters: 1998-2017” (2018) at 3, online (pdf ): PreventionWeb <www.preventionweb.net/
files/61119_credeconomiclosses.pdf> [UNISDR]; Patricia Espinosa & Mami Mizutori,
“Climate Change Is a Major Multiplier of Disaster Losses”, Editorial (12 October 2018),
online: UNFCCC <unfccc.int/news/climate-change-is-a-major-multiplier-of-disaster-losses>.
3.  See Paris Agreement, 12 December 2015, Can TS 2016 No 9 (entered into force 4 November
2016, accession by Canada 22 April 2016), art 2(1)(a); The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC), “Summary for Policymakers” (2018) at 13, 15, online (pdf ): IPCC <www.
ipcc.ch/sr15/chapter/summary-for-policy-makers/> [IPCC, “Summary for Policymakers”].
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unless the temperature increase is limited to 1.5°C. To achieve this target,
carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions must be cut by forty-five per cent by 2030,
which would require “rapid and far-reaching transitions” in energy, land,
transport, and infrastructure.4
However, the deep decarbonization needed to combat global warming
can only take place if the financial system is aligned with the Paris Agreement
goals. This point is especially important in the Canadian context, where the
government has pledged under the Paris Agreement to reduce its annual
emissions to thirty per cent below 2005 levels by 2030, 5 but the capital markets
are heavily dependent on the resources which produce the GHG emissions
in the first place. Canada can, therefore, achieve its Paris targets only if its
financial flows also become consistent with “a pathway towards low greenhouse
gas emissions”.6
At the forefront of the structural transition to a low-carbon economy are
pension funds, institutional investors entrusted with providing retirement
income for millions of people. In Canada, pension funds manage over CAD
3.8 trillion in gross assets, acting as major investors across the domestic and
global economy.7 As such, there is the potential for these pension funds to
mobilize considerable capital for climate-friendly investments and to exert
significant pressure for decarbonization in line with the Paris Agreement goals.8
Furthermore, as long-term, highly diversified financial institutions, Canadian
4.  IPCC, “Summary for Policymakers”, supra note 3 at 12–15.
5.  See Government of Canada, “Canada’s 2017 Nationally Determined Contribution
Submission to The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change” (2017)
at 4, online (pdf ): UNFCCC <www4.unfccc.int/sites/ndcstaging/PublishedDocuments/
Canada%20First/Canada%20First%20NDC-Revised%20submission%202017-05-11.pdf>
[Government of Canada, “Contribution”]. In fact, Jeff Rubin notes that the oil sands producers
account for the largest stocks on the Toronto Stock Exchange, which is among the most carbonintensive stock indices. See Jeff Rubin, “The Case for Divesting from Fossil Fuels in Canada”
(2016) CIGI Working Paper No 112 at 6, online (pdf ): Centre for International Governance
Innovation <www.cigionline.org/publications/case-divesting-fossil-fuels-canada>.
6.  Paris Agreement, supra note 3, art 2(c).
7.  This number is based on the latest data provided by Statistics Canada. See Statistics Canada,
Pension Satellite Account, Pension Assets at Market Value, by Type of Plan (x 1,000,000), Table
36-10-0576-01 (last visited 6 October 2019), online: <www150.statcan.gc.ca/t1/tbl1/en/
tv.action?pid=3610057601>.
8.  Globally, it is estimated that achieving the Paris Agreement would require investments
worth CAD 100 trillion, a number which could be substantially higher if global warming
is sought to be limited to 1.5°C. See Environment and Climate Change Canada, Interim
Reportof the Expert Panel on Sustainable Finance, Catalogue No En4-350/1-2018E-PDF
(Gatineau: ECCC, 2018) at 5, online: <publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2018/eccc/
En4-350-1-2018-eng.pdf> [Expert Panel, Interim Report]. For additional figures see also Paris
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pension funds are increasingly exposed to climate-related financial risks. This
point is becoming increasingly evident in light of a growing body of evidence
that climate change will significantly impact the financial system in the coming
decades.9 Extreme weather events, such as wildfires and hurricanes, can disrupt
the operations of financial institutions, impair their assets, and exponentially
increase their insurable losses (“physical risks”).10 In Canada, the annual
insurable losses from extreme weather events have risen from CAD 400 million
a few decades ago to an astonishing CAD 1.9 billion in 2018.11 Financial
institutions are also vulnerable to risks that arise in the structural transition to a
lower-carbon economy, such as vast reserves of fossil fuels becoming stranded,
thereby placing significant market valuations at risk (“transition risks”).12
It is imperative to understand the governance of climate-related financial
risks in the Canadian pension sector because these institutions manage a large
amount of capital, frequently adopt long-term investment strategies, and bear a
Agreement, supra note 3; European Environment Agency, “Atmospheric Greenhouse Gas
Concentrations” (20 March 2019), online: European Environment Agency <www.eea.europa.eu/
data-and-maps/indicators/atmospheric-greenhouse-gas-concentrations-6/assessment>.
9.  The World Bank estimates that climate change will put USD 158 trillion in assets at risk
from river and coastal floods by 2050. See Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery,
“The Making of a Riskier Future: How Our Decisions Are Shaping Future Disaster Risk” (2016)
at 51, online (pdf ): Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery <www.gfdrr.org/sites/
default/files/publication/Riskier%20Future.pdf>. Another study by the Economist Intelligence
Unit estimated that a 6°C rise in temperatures could wipe US$43 trillion off of global financial
markets. See The Economist Intelligence Unit, “The Cost of Inaction: Recognizing the Value
at Risk From Climate Change” (2015) at 4, online (pdf ): The Economist Intelligence Unit
<eiuperspectives.economist.com/sites/default/files/The%20cost%20of%20inaction_0.pdf>.
Most recently, the Bank of Canada has explicitly cited climate change as a top vulnerability in
the Canadian financial system. See Stephen Poloz, “Opening Statement Following the Release
of the Financial System Review” (Speech delivered at Bank of Canada, 16 May 2019), online:
Bank of Canada <www.bankofcanada.ca/2019/05/opening-statement-160519/>.
10.  See UNISDR, supra note 2 at 3; Espinosa & Mizutori, supra note 2; Bank of Canada,
“Financial System Review—2019” (May 2019) at 28, online (pdf ): Bank of Canada <www.
bankofcanada.ca/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/Financial-System-Review%E2%80%942019Bank-of-Canada.pdf>.
11.  See Insurance Bureau of Canada, “Severe Weather Causes $1.9 Billion in Insured Damage
in 2018” (16 January 2019), online: Insurance Bureau of Canada <www.ibc.ca/on/resources/
media-centre/media-releases/severe-weather-causes-190-million-in-insured-damage-in-2018>.
See also Glen Hodgson, “The Costs of Climate Change Are Rising”, The Globe and Mail (15
May 2018), online: <www.theglobeandmail.com/business/commentary/article-the-costs-ofclimate-change-are-rising/>.
12.  J-F Mercure et al, “Macroeconomic Impact of Stranded Fossil Fuel Assets” (2018) 8:1
Nature Climate Change 588 at 588, online: <www.nature.com/articles/s41558-018-0182-1>.
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significant mandate to provide a retirement income to plan beneficiaries. There
will be particularly profound consequences for young Canadians who reach the
age of retirement in forty to fifty years as the worst effects of global warming
unfold, and the full extent of climate-related financial risks materialize.
Furthermore, Canadian law requires pension trustees and administrators to
act in the best interests of their beneficiaries. If the Canadian pension sector
disregards climate-related financial risks or does not sufficiently protect the
investments of its plan beneficiaries, this may amount to a breach of fiduciary
duty.13
This article provides an in-depth analysis of the current practices of the five
largest pension funds in Canada regarding climate-related financial risks. The
Canada Pension Plan Investment Board (CPPIB), Caisse de dépôt et placement
du Québec (CDPQ), Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan (OTPP), Public Sector
Pension Investment Board (PSPIB), and British Columbia Investment
Management Corporation (BCIMC) were selected for analysis due to their
extensive and diverse portfolios. These institutions collectively control about
CAD 1.2 trillion net assets.14
There are a variety of avenues that pension funds may pursue to address
climate-related financial risks, ranging from strategic oversight by the board
of directors to direct engagement with investee companies on their approach
to climate change. These activities may be conceptualized as falling into three
core areas: (1) organizational governance, (2) strategy and risk management,
and (3) engagement and advocacy. The category of organizational governance
encompasses investment policies and guidelines, as well as the involvement of
senior management and board of directors with respect to the organizational
13.  The argument that pension funds’ fiduciary duty encompasses climate change has found
strong support among Canadian scholars. See e.g. Edward J Waitzer & Douglas Sarro, “The
Public Fiduciary: Emerging Themes in Canadian Fiduciary Law for Pension Trustees” (2012)
91:1 Can Bar Rev 163 at 181; Janis Sarra, “Fiduciary Obligations in Business and Investment:
Implications of Climate Change” (2018) at 6, online (pdf ): Commonwealth Climate and Law
Initiative <ccli.ouce.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/Janis-Sarra_Fiduciary-Obligationin-Business-and-Investment.pdf>.
14.  This number is based on the author’s calculation which draws upon the latest
publiclyavailable information on the assets of the five Canadian pension funds. To access this
information, see Canada Pension Plan Investment Board, “Our Performance” (last visited 14
October 2019), online: CPP Investments <www.cppib.com/en/our-performance/>; Ontario
Teachers’ Pension Plan, “Performance”, (last visited 14 October 2019), online: Ontario Teachers’
Pension Plan <www.otpp.com/investments/performance> ; British Columbia Investment
Management Corporation, “BCI at a Glance” (last visited 14 October 2019), online: British
Columbia Investment <www.bci.ca/investments-performance/portfolio/>; Caisse de Dépôt et
Placement du Québec, “Snapshot of la Caisse” (last visited 14 October 2019), online: Caisse du
Dépôt et Placement du Québec <www.cdpq.com/en/about-us/snapshot>; Public Sector Pension
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approach of the institution on climate-related financial risk. Strategy and
risk management refers to any specific climate strategies that are adopted by
pension funds, and any tools and metrics that are employed to manage and
mitigate climate-related financial risks. Finally, the category of engagement and
advocacy pertains to any stewardship practices that monitor or seek to improve
the approach of investee companies toward climate change. This article explores
current progress on each of these three core areas of activity concerning the
recommendations of the Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures
(TCFD).15 The TCFD recommendations promote consistent and meaningful
disclosure of climate-related financial risks and opportunities, and are regarded
as a crucial soft law instrument that has received significant support amongst
the G20 countries and the broader business and finance communities.16
The article argues that although the five Canadian pension funds discussed
have begun to understand the importance of climate change, their current
governance of climate-related financial risks faces critical limitations. The most
pressing challenge to date has been the absence of a strong policy signal to sway
markets in the direction of a transition to a lower-carbon economy. The lack of
cohesion in Canada’s climate policy, driven by enormous subsidies to the fossil
fuel industry and a willingness to bail out high emitters, has distorted market
incentives for climate change adaptation and mitigation. This is significant
because profits and losses drive market activity. Although it may be unethical for
investors to bet against the government implementing environmental policies
that penalize companies, the lack of a policy signal encourages investors to
disregard environmental, social, and governance (ESG) risks and maximize their
profits in a very competitive market environment. Without an unequivocal cue
from Canadian policymakers, the pension sector will not have enough support
to make the bold changes that are necessary in order to respond to climate risks
in a timely fashion.
The forthcoming analysis will identify and discuss the key shortcomings
in current practices of pension funds, including: significant reliance on
marketindices that have a high carbon concentration, the fragmented and
Investment Board, “FY19: 6-month Performance” (last visited 14 October 2019), online: PSP
Investments <www.investpsp.com/en/>.
15.  See Task Force on Climate-Related Financial Disclosures, “Recommendations of the Task
Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures” (15 June 2017), online (pdf ): TCFD <www.
fsb-tcfd.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/FINAL-2017-TCFD-Report-11052018.pdf>
[TCFD].
16.  See e.g. G7, “Communiqué: G7 Bologna Environment Ministers’ Meeting Bologna”
(12 June 2017), online: University of Toronto G8 Information Centre <www.g8.utoronto.
ca/environment/2017-environment.html>; G20, “Leaders’ Declaration: Shaping an
Interconnected World” (7 July 2017) at 10, online (pdf ): University of Toronto G20 Information
Centre <www.g20.utoronto.ca/2017/2017-G20-leaders-declaration.pdf>; Ceres, “Nearly 400

6

(2020) 46:1 Queen’s LJ

inadequate disclosure of climate-related financial information, the significant
exposure of pension funds to carbon-intensive economic sectors, a lack of
clarity regarding the fiduciary duty of administrators and managers with respect
to climate change, a narrow view of engagement and advocacy which disregards
corporate borrowers, and the unsuitability of engagement and advocacy in the
context of resource-intensive, high emission economic sectors. This article
provides suggested reforms for each of these limitations. However, it remains
incumbent on Canadian policymakers to create the necessary incentives to
accelerate an urgently needed transition to a low-carbon economy.
The article proceeds as follows. It starts by considering the high-level
governance of climate change and the pension funds boards’ role in setting
the overall organizational tone on climate change. It identifies several gaps in
the boards’ oversight of climate-related risks and offers pathways for reform.
The article then moves to discuss the climate-related financial risks and the
strategies, tools, and metrics that are currently used by pension funds to address
them. It evaluates these practices and points to shortcomings or challenges
that they currently face. The next section looks at engagement and advocacy
practices of pension funds. It discusses the prevalent engagement mechanisms,
challenging the current narrow focus on shareholder engagement. The article
then revisits the effectiveness of engagement as the primary tool to address
climate-related risks, especially in resource-intensive, high-emission economic
sectors. The last section revisits how Canadian pension funds fare in comparison
to their international peers and highlights areas for improvement. It considers
how the governance of climate change in the pension sector is intertwined with
Canada’s climate policy and its progress in implementing the Paris Agreement.
It calls for bolder policy signals that could accelerate the low-carbon transition
in the marketplace and proposes mandating the disclosure of climate-related
risks and addressing misconceptions around the scope of fiduciary duty.

I. Organizational Governance
Nearly all Canadian pension funds are created by specific federal or
provincial legislation, which sets out their mandate and governance structure.17
Independent governance is a defining feature of the Canadian pension model
that can be traced back to the 1987 Rowan Task Force Report to the Ontario
Global Investors Urge G20 to Stand by Paris Agreement and Drive Its Swift Implementation” (3
July 2017), online: Ceres <www.ceres.org/news-center/press-releases/over-200-global-investorsurge-g7-stand-paris-agreement-and-drive-its>.
17.  See Canada Pension Plan Investment Board Act, SC 1997, c 40 [CPPIBA]; Public Sector
Pension Investment Board Act, SC 1999, c 34 [PSPIBA]; Teachers’ Pension Act, RSO 1990, c
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government, which recommended setting up public pension funds as
independent entities.18 Under this model, governments sponsor or contribute
to pension funds, but pension funds operate at arm’s length from governments
and can, therefore, make decisions free from political interference.19
Administration and management of investments are usually vested in an
in-house team of professionals who seek to create long-term value for plan
beneficiaries.20 The funds allocate their portfolios across different geographies
and asset classes, ranging from public and private equity markets to real estate
and infrastructure.21 Diversification is, hence, a fundamental investment
strategy among Canadian pension funds.
At the top of the organizational governance sit independent boards of
directors that oversee pension funds’ operations. For instance, the Canada
Pension Plan Investment Board Act provides that “the board of directors shall
manage or supervise the management of the business and affairs” of the
pension plan.22 Similar language can be found in other pension statutes that
assign the administration of pension plans to a board of directors, tasking them
with establishing investment policies, standards, and procedures.23 The board
of directors owe a fiduciary duty to the plan beneficiaries. This duty can be
inferred from the pension statutes, which call upon the directors to exercise
the “care, diligence, and skill” of a prudent person or explicitly require them to
T.1 [Teachers’ Pension Act (Ont)]; Public Sector Pension Plans Act SBC 1999, c 44; Public Sector
Pension Plans Act, RSA 2000, c P-41; Act Respecting the Caisse de Dépôt et Placement du Québec,
CQLR c C-2 [CDPQA].
18.  World Bank, “The Evolution of the Canadian Pension Model: Practical Lessons for
Building World-class Pension Organizations” (2017) World Bank Working Group No 121375
at 8, online: World Bank <documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/780721510639698502/Theevolution-of-the-Canadian-pension-model-practical-lessons-for-building-world-class-pensionorganizations>; Ontario, Task Force on the Investment of Public Sector Pension Fund, In Whose
Interest? (Toronto: Ministry of Finance, 1987) (Chair: Malcolm Rowan).
19.  See e.g. CPPIBA, supra note 17, ss 3(2), (4); PSPIBA, supra note 17, ss 3(2), (4); Teachers’
Pension Act (Ont), supra note 17, s 7.
20.  See World Bank, supra note 18 at 13.
21.  See PricewaterhouseCoopers, “Global Pension Funds: Best Practices in the Pension Funds
Investment Process” (2016) at 70–78, online (pdf ): PricewaterhouseCoopers <www.pwc.lu/en/
asset-management/docs/pwc-awm-global-pension-funds.pdf>.
22.  CPPIBA, supra note 17, s 8(1).
23.  See PSPIBA, supra note 17, ss 6(1), 7; Pension Benefits Standards Act, SBC 2012, c 30,
ss 9, 35(3) [Pension Benefits Standards Act (BC)]; CDPQA, supra note 17, s 5; Pension Benefits
Act, RSO 1990, c P.8, s 8(1)(f ) [Pension Benefit Act (Ont)]; Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan,
“Mandate of The Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan Board” (last visited 6 October2019), online
(pdf ): Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan <www.otpp.com/documents/10179/20940/mandate0608.
pdf/ad67da10-5de2-41e9-9700-f52ec0a9aca6>.
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act “in the best interests of the contributors and beneficiaries”.24 Furthermore,
the significant discretion vested in boards for managing the retirement funds,
coupled with the vulnerability of the plan members who ultimately depend on
their pension funds for retirement income, is aligned with the hallmarks of the
fiduciary relationship set out by the Supreme Court of Canada.25
The Canadian pension funds’ approach to climate change can be situated
within their broader investment perspectives. Investment policies of pension
funds, which usually draw upon the legislative and regulatory frameworks
underlying their operations, indicate a common goal of maximizing financial
returns without undue risk of loss.26 The concept of risk is broad enough to
include ESG factors that can affect financial returns. The latest guidelines issued
by the Canadian Association of Pension Supervisory Authorities (CAPSA)
explicitly refer to certain ESG risks as a subset of investment risks that must
be monitored and managed by pension funds.27 The boards of all pension
funds studied here have adopted responsible investment (RI) policies, which
explain how the ESG issues are incorporated into the investment process and

24.  With regards to pension statutes, see CPPIBA, supra note 17, s 14(1); PSPIBA, supra note
17, s 16(1); ON Pension Benefits Act (Ont), supra note 23, s 22(1); Pension Benefits Standards
Act (BC), supra note 23, s 35(3). The Financial Services Commission of Ontario provides that
a “pension plan administrator (administrator) is responsible for investing the pension fund
in accordance with the administrator’s standard of care, in a prudent manner, and in the best
interests of the pension plan’s beneficiaries.” See Financial Services Commission of Ontario
(FSCO), Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) Factors (Public Consultation), No
IGN-004, (30 June 2015) at 1, online (pdf ): FSCO <www.fsco.gov.on.ca/en/pensions/fsco_
consultations/Documents/IGN004.pdf> at 1 [FSCO, “ESG Factors”]. See also Ari Kaplan &
Mitch Frazer, Pension Law, 2nd ed (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2013) at 322.
25.  See Alberta v Elder Advocates of Alberta Society, 2011 SCC 24 at paras 27–36; Frame v
Smith, [1987] 2 SCR 99 at 148–50, 42 DLR (4th) 81; Lac Minerals Ltd v International Corona
Resources Ltd, [1989] 2 SCR 574 at 598–99, 61 DLR (4th) 14; Professional Institute of the Public
Service of Canada v Canada (Attorney General), 2012 SCC 71 at para 142.
26.  For examples of investment mandates in pension legislations, see CPPIBA, supra note
17, s 5(c); PSPIBA, supra note 17, s 4(b); CDPQA, supra note 17, s 4.1. For examples of
investment mandates as interpreted and applied by pension funds, see e.g. Canadian Pension
Plan Investment Board, “Our Mandate” (last visited 6 October 2019), online: The Canadian
Pension Plan Investment Board <www.cppib.com/en/who-we-are/our-mandate/>; Ontario
Teachers’ Pension Plan, “Investment Strategy” (6 October 2019), online: Ontario Teachers’
Pension Plan <www.otpp.com/investments/performance/investment-strategy>.
27.  See Canadian Association of Pension Supervisory Authorities (CAPSA), “Guideline No.
4: Pension Plan Governance Guideline” (December 2016) at 9, online: Canadian Association of
Pension Supervisory Authorities <www.capsa-acor.org/Documents/View/52>.
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decision-making.28 A common theme across these policies is the understanding
that responsible corporate behaviour addressing ESG issues can enhance
financial returns in the long run.29 These policies recognize that as long-term
investors with a fiduciary duty to their beneficiaries, the pension funds have a
duty to consider the ESG risks and opportunities in their investment process.
The BCIMC Responsible Investing Policy, for instance, indicates that the
fund’s approach to ESGs comprises of three core activities: (1) integration
of ESG factors into the investment analysis and decision-making, (2) active
participation and addressing systemic risks in capital markets, and (3) active
ownership of portfolio companies.30 The PSPIB Responsible Investment Policy
indicates that it focuses on “identifying material ESG risks and opportunities”
that can potentially affect “a company’s ability to create or preserve long-term
financial value”.31 The fund expects the companies to go beyond meeting the
essential legal and regulatory requirements to embrace ESG practices that
contribute to their long-term performance.32
The pension funds recognize climate change as a material ESG factor that
is anchored in their responsible investment philosophies. All the funds studied
here publicly acknowledge that climate change can pose a significant risk to

28.  
See Canadian Pension Plan Investment Board, “Policy on Responsible Investing” (10
August 2010), online (pdf): The Canada Pension Plan Investment Board <www.cppib.com/
content/dam/cppib/Who%20We%20Are/Governance/Policies/Responsible_Investing_
Policy_August2010.pdf> [CPPIB, “RI Policy”]; British Columbia Investment Management
Corporation , “An Overview of BCI’s Approach to Responsible Investing” (2015), online: British
Columbia
Investments
<read.uberflip.com/i/605664-an-overview-of-bcis-approach-to-responsibleinvesting> [BCIMC, “RI Approach”]; Caisse du Dépôt et Placement du Québec, “Policy on Responsible
Investment” (last visited 6 October 2019), online (pdf): Caisse du Dépôt et Placement du Québec <www.
cdpq.com/sites/default/files/medias/pdf/en/politique_investissement_responsable_en.pdf> [CDPQ, “RI
Policy”]; Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan, “2018 Responsible Investing Report” (2018), online: Ontario
Teachers’ Pension Plan <www.otpp.com/documents/10179/803196/Ontario+Teachers+2018+RI+Report/
be541cfb-15c2-4c43-bfb7-729a229c857a> [OTPP, “2018 RI Report”]; Public Sector Pension Investmenr
Board, “Responsible Investment Policy” (November 2017), online (pdf): PSP Investments <https://
www.investpsp.com/media/filer_public/02-we-are-psp/02-investing-responsibly/content-2/documents/
Responsible_Investment_Policy_November_2017_English_FINAL-new_logo.pdf> [PSPIB, “RI Policy”].
29.  See CPPIB, “RI Policy”, supra note 28 at 2; BCIMC, “RI Approach”, supra note 28 at 4;
CDPQ, “RI Policy”, supra note 28 at 2; PSPIB, “RI Policy”, supra note 28 at 2; OTPP, “2018
RI Report”, supra note 28 at 2.
30.  BCIMC, “RI Approach”, supra note 28 at 6.
31.  PSPIB, “RI Policy”, supra note 28 at 2.
32.  See ibid at 3.
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their financial returns and their ability to fulfil their long-term obligations.33
The CPPIB, for instance, considers climate change “one of the most significant
physical, social, technological and economic challenges of our time”, and
the OTPP acknowledges that “climate change is one of the biggest and most
daunting challenges facing the world.”34
Four pension funds, namely the BCIMC, CDPQ, CPPIB, and OTPP, report
that their boards of directors oversee the climate-related risks and opportunities
through approving the funds’ climate change plans and receiving status updates
from senior management.35 The BCIMC’s management, for instance, reports
to the board on climate change strategy, risk assessments, and any changes to
the fund’s overall approach to climate change.36 It is also important to note that
two pension funds, namely the CPPIB and OTPP, have established working
groups composed of senior management to better understand the structural
shifts arising from climate change and examine its long-term impacts on their
investment portfolios.37
A. Pathways to Improve Boards’ Oversight of Climate Change
As these examples suggest, climate change is slowly appearing on the
boardroom agenda, though the level of board engagement is still quite limited.
33.  See Canadian Pension Plan Investmen Board, “CPPIB’s Approach to Climate Change”
(March 2017), online: The Canada Pension Plan Investment Board <www.cppib.com/en/
public-media/headlines/2017/cppibs- approach-climate-change/> [CPPIB, “Approach to
Climate Change”]; Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan, “Climate Change” (last visited 6 October
2019), online (pdf ): Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan <www.otpp.com/documents/10179/859251//152d6724-3d35-4f69-8971-641ec13ed737/2018%20Climate%20Change%20Report.pdf>
[OTPP, “Climate Change”]; Public Sector Pension Investment Board, “2019 Responsible
Investment Report” (2019) at 5, online (pdf ): PSP Investments <www.investpsp.com/media/filer_
public/documents/PSP-2019-responsible-investment-report-en.pdf> [PSPIB, “2019 RI Report”].
34.  CPPIB, “Approach to Climate Change”, supra note 33; OTPP, “Climate Change”, supra
note 33 at 1.
35.  See Canadian Pension Plan Investmenr Board, “2019 Annual Report: Investing for
Generations” (2019) at 28, online (pdf ): The Canada Pension Plan Investment Board <www.
cppib.com/documents/2048/F2019-annual-report_-june-6-2019-EN.pdf> [CPPIB, “2019
Annual Report”]; OTPP, “2018 RI Report”, supra note 28 at 7; CDPQ, “RI Policy”, supra
note 28 at 6; British Columbia Investment Management Corporation, “BCI’s Climate Action
Plan and Approach to the TCFD Recommendations” (2018) at 12, online: British Columbia
Investment Management Corporation <www.bci.ca/bci-releases-climate-action-plan-and-approachto-the-tcfd-recommendations/> [BCIMC, “Climate Action Plan”].
36.  See BCIMC, “Climate Action Plan”, supra note 35 at 12.
37.  See CPPIB, “Approach to Climate Change”, supra note 33; Ontario Teachers’ Pension
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As fiduciaries, the boards of directors have a duty to evaluate the risks caused
by climate change to change their portfolios. This requires going beyond just
passive receipt of information and instead establishing a robust process to oversee
and verify their funds’ progress in tackling climate change. Similar to financial
statements that are subject to significant scrutiny by directors and auditors, the
measurement and management of climate risks must also undergo adequate
vetting and verification. As a prerequisite for effective oversight, boards need to
acquire a thorough knowledge of how relevant and significant climate change
is to their organizations’ investment strategy, financial performance, and asset
allocation. Undertaking specialized training and drawing upon external services,
such as those offered by consultancies specializing in climate risk management,
are among the measures that can help boards become “climate competent”.
A further issue for boards is to revisit the suitability of their governance
structures for climate change adaptation and mitigation. This point particularly
concerns the market indices that Canadian pension funds currently replicate
or use as benchmarks to measure performance. For example, the TSX 60,
S&P 500, and MSCI World, which are among the most commonly used
benchmarks, are respectively consistent with 4.6°C, 4.0°C, and 3.7°C global
warming scenarios.38 Such levels of carbon intensity make these indices
inappropriate indicators of long-term value generation and provide a misguided
tool for management compensation.39 Given the significance of market indices

Plan, “2018 Climate Change Report” (2018) at 2, online (pdf ): Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan
<www.otpp.com/documents/10179/859251/Climate+Change+Report+2018/152d67243d35-4f69-8971-641ec13ed737> [OTPP, “2018 Climate Change Report”].
38.  See Expert Panel, Interim Report, supra note 8 at 30. For a list of indices used by Canadian
pension funds, see Public Sector Pension Investment Board, “2019 Annual Report” (2019) at 36,
online: PSP Investments <www.investpsp.com/media/filer_public/documents/PSP-2019-annualreport-en.pdf>; Ontatio Teachers’ Pension Plan, “Benchmarks” (last visited 6 October 2019),
online: Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan <www.otpp.com/investments/performance/benchmarks>;
British Columbia Investment Management Corporation, “Corporate Annual Report 20182019” (2019) at 31, online (pdf ): British Columbia Investment Management Corporation <www.
bci.ca/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/F2019-Corporate-Annual-Report_Final_SECURED.
pdf>; CPPIB, “2019 Annual Report”, supra note 35 at 30. It is interesting to note the CPPIB
uses as a reference portfolio the S&P Global LargeMidCap, which has a higher carbon intensity
than the S&P 500. See S&P Dow Jones Indices, “S&P Global LargeMidCap (USD)” (last
visited 6 October 2019), online: S&P Dow Jones Indices <www.spglobal.com/spdji/en/indices/
equity/sp-developed-largemidcap/#overview>; S&P Dow Jones Indices, “S&P 500” (last visited
6 October 2019), online: S&P Dow Jones Indices <ca.spindices.com/indices/equity/sp-500>.
39.  For example, the CPPIB rewards its senior management based on their performance
relative to the reference portfolio, using S&P Global LargeMidCap which, as mentioned above,
has a particularly high carbon intensity. See CPPIB, “2019 Annual Report”, supra note 35 at 91.
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for capital allocation and measuring performance, it is imperative that they
capture climate considerations.40
Pension funds can play an instrumental role by demanding that index
providers develop low-carbon indices that are aligned with future low-carbon
scenarios. However, the misalignment between market indices and the collective
goal of transitioning to a low-carbon economy cannot simply be left to markets
to fix. Regulatory intervention is essential to require consistent and meaningful
reporting of climate risks on market indices so that investors, including pension
funds, can understand how a market index is aligned with Canada’s emission
targets under the Paris Agreement.41 Regulators should also set minimum
standards for the development of indices that can have a positive impact in
terms of emission reductions and redirecting investments to sustainable assets
and projects.42
Finally, improvements can be made in how boards communicate and
engage with their beneficiaries on climate change. At the time of writing this
paper, there is no indication that the pension funds studied seek to engage
with their plan members on their climate change strategy. This gap seems
problematic as giving beneficiaries a voice in pension fund governance is
consistent with the principles of fiduciary law.43 There is increasing evidence
that many individuals view climate change as a pressing issue warranting
urgent action.44 It is therefore important for boards to hear the views of
40.  The Canadian Expert Panel on Sustainable Finance acknowledges that “[t]raditional
market-based benchmark indices remain a dominant driver of investment allocation” and goes
on to observe that “[m]ost of today’s core benchmark indices are not constructed with climate or
sustainability criteria, nor do they provide transparency into forward-looking climate impacts or
emissions exposure.” See Expert Panel on Sustainable Finance, Final Report of the Expert Panel on
Sustainable Finance, by Tiff Macklem et al, Catalogue No En4-350/2-2019E-PDF (Gatineau:
Environment and Climate Change Canada, 2019) at 33, online (pdf ): <publications.gc.ca/
collections/collection_2019/eccc/En4-350-2-2019-eng.pdf> [Expert Panel, Final Report].
41.  It is important to note here that the Toronto Stock Exchange does not require ESG
disclosure as a listing prerequisite and any such disclosure follows the materiality test which
is discussed in the next section. See Sustainable Stock Exchanges Initiative, “TMX Group Inc
(Toronto Stock Exchange)” (last visited 13 October 2019), online: Sustainable Stock Exchanges
Initiative <sseinitiative.org/fact-sheet/tmx/>.
42.  An interesting model in this respect is the European Commission’s proposal which seeks to
enhance the ESG transparency of benchmarks and introduce common standards for low-carbon
and positive-carbon benchmarks. See EC, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament
and of the Council Amending Regulation (EU) 2016/1011 on Low Carbon Benchmarks and
Positive Carbon Impact Benchmarks, [2018] 355/2018 at 2, online (pdf ): EUR-Lex <ec.europa.
eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/1/2018/EN/COM-2018-355-F1-EN-MAIN-PART-1.PDF>.
43.  See Waitzer & Sarro, supra note 13 at 194.
44.  For instance, a 2018 survey by the Pew Research Center conveyed that sixty-six per cent
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their plan members, especially when they formulate their organizations’
investment policies and strategies, which could have important implications
for their members’ retirement security. In particular, funds can take a proactive
approach by conducting targeted surveys and workshops which specifically
try to initiate a dialogue with plan members on funds’ climate change-related
policies and activities. These measures can not only help pension funds educate
their plan members on their climate actions, but also receive feedback on their
progress and future priorities from stakeholders whom they are ultimately
bound to serve.

II. Strategy and Risk Management
A. A Primer on Climate Risk Management
As mentioned previously, financial risks posed by climate change can be
considered under two broad categories: physical risks and transition risks.
Physical risks refer to damage to assets or disruption of supply chains caused by
climate-related events, such as floods and storms, or long-term climate trends,
such as rising sea levels.45 Transition risks are financial risks that arise in the
process of transitioning to a lower-carbon economy and lead to a revaluation
of a range of assets.46 Legal and policy changes, technological innovations, and
changes in the marketplace are common examples of transition risks. For
example, the adoption of carbon-pricing regulations can make fossil fuel
of Canadian respondents saw climate change as a major threat to their country. See World
Economic Forum, “Climate change is the world’s biggest threat, according to a new
global survey” (22 February 2019), online: World Economic Forum <www.weforum.org/
agenda/2019/02/climate-change-seen-as-top-threat-in-global-survey>. The World Economic
Forum’s Global Risks Report indicate that leaders are concerned about the impact and
likelihood of environmental threats. See World Economic Forum, “The Global Risks Report
2019” (2019), online (pdf ): World Economic Forum <www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_Global_
Risks_Report_2019.pdf>. An online poll found that forty-two per cent of Canadians now
describe climate change as an emergency. See Cormac Mac Sweeney, “42% of Canadians see
climate change as a national emergency: poll”, CityNews (12 August 2019), online: <toronto.
citynews.ca/2019/08/12/canada-climate-change-national-emergency-poll/>. In a 2019 survey,
ninety-three per cent of Europeans saw climate change as a serious problem. See European
Commission, “Citizen Support for Climate Action”, online: European Commission <ec.europa.
eu/clima/citizens/support_en>.
45.  See TCFD, supra note 15 at 6; Mark Carney, “Breaking the Tragedy of the Horizon –
Climate Change and Financial Stability” (Speech delivered at Lloyd’s of London, 29 September
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of a range of assets.46 Legal and policy changes, technological innovations,
and changes in the marketplace are common examples of transition risks. For
example, the adoption of carbon-pricing regulations can make fossil fuel
production more expensive and drive down the valuation of fossil fuel
companies. Similarly, the failure of organizations to disclose the impact of
climate change on their business models or adopt necessary climate mitigation
or adaptation practices can increase the risk of litigation by their stakeholders. 47
The TCFD recommends that organizations describe the climate changerelated risks and opportunities they face in the short and long run and its
impact on their business, strategy, and financial models. Importantly, the
TCFD asks organizations to test the resiliency of their business models under
various plausible future scenarios, including a 2°C or lower scenario consistent
with the commitments made under the Paris Agreement.48 Further, the TCFD
recommends disclosing the processes used for assessing and managing climate
change-related risks and opportunities and how they are integrated into the
organization’s overall risk management. Finally, organizations should disclose
the metrics they use for strategy and risk management purposes and tracking
Scopes 1 and 2 (and 3 if relevant) greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions.49 Climate
change-related targets and the organization’s performance against them should
be disclosed as well.50
All five pension funds studied here recognize the physical and transition
risks associated with climate change.51 There is also growing support for the
TCFD’s initiative on climate disclosure and a visible attempt to align with its
2015) at 4, online (pdf ): Bank for International Settlements <https://www.bis.org/review/
r151009a.pdf>.
46.  See TCFD, supra note 15 at 5–6; Carney, supra note 45 at 4.
47.  A notable example in this respect is the lawsuits brought against oil companies for their
contribution to the temperature increase and rising sea levels, or their lack of transparency on
climate risks. The New York Attorney General, for instance, has filed a suit against ExxonMobil
alleging a discrepancy between the company’s internal assumptions on climate change and those
disclosed externally. See New York (City of ) v BP PLC, 325 F Supp 3d 466 (SDNY 2018) at 468–
70; John Schwartz, “New York Sues Exxon Mobil, Saying It Deceived Shareholders on Climate
Change”, The New York Times (24 October 2018), online: <www.nytimes.com/2018/10/24/
climate/exxon-lawsuit-climate-change.html>.
48.  See TCFD, supra note 15 at 14.
49.  Scope 1 refers to all GHG emissions. Scope 2 refers to indirect GHG emissions from
consumption of purchased electricity, heat, and steam. Scope 3 refers to all indirect GHG
emissions that are not captured by Scope 2, such as employee travel and waste disposal. See
ibid at 63.
50.  See ibid at 14.
51. See Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan, “Responsible Investing – Climate Change” (last
visited 19 October 2020), online: Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan <www.ottp.com/investments/
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recommendations. In particular, the CDPQ, BCIMC, and OTPP have provided
a preliminary outline of their approach to the TCFD recommendations and
how they are applying them in their respective organizations.52 All the funds
are currently working toward developing strategies and risk management tools
specific to climate risks. The CPPIB, for instance, has established a Climate
Change Steering Committee and a Climate Change Program Management
Office, tasking them with developing an enterprise-wide climate change
initiative.53 These groups are currently working on creating “a climate change
toolkit, a dynamic global energy outlook and a carbon footprinting tool”.54
The OTPP also has a cross-departmental climate change working group that
supports “the assessment, management and reporting of material climaterelated issues”.55
B. Integrating Climate Considerations into Investment Decisions
Although there is some variance among the pension funds’ climate strategies,
they seem to converge on three principles: (1) integrating climate risks into
investment strategies, (2) engaging with investee companies on climate change,
and (3) seeking investment opportunities in clean energy.56 Since engagement
will be discussed at great length in the next section, the analysis in this section
focuses on the first and third principles, namely climate change integration
and clean investments. An illustrative example of the first principle is the
responsible-investing/climate-change>; Canadian Pension Plan Investment Board, “Approach
to Climate Change”, supra note 33; Caisse du Dépôt et Placement du Québec, “Climate
Change” (last visited 13 October 2019), online: Caisse du Dépôt et Placement du Québec <www.
cdpq.com/en/investments/stewardship-investing/climate-change>; PSPIB, “2019 RI Report ”,
supra note 33 at 5; BCIMC, “Climate Action Plan”, supra note 35 at 3.
52.  Caisse du Dépôt et Placement du Québec, “2018 Stewardship Investing” (2018) at 39,
online (pdf ): Caisse du Dépôt et Placement du Québec <www.cdpq.com/sites/default/files/medias/
pdf/en/ra/id2018_rapport_investissement_durable_en.pdf> [CDPQ, “2018 Stewardship
Investing Report”]; OTPP, “2018 Climate Change Report”, supra note 37; BCIMC, “Climate
Action Plan”, supra note 35 at 11.
53.  See Canadian Pension Plan Investment Board, “Report on Sustainable Investing: Investing
Responsibility for CPP Contributors and Beneficiaries” (2019) at 14–15, online (pdf ): CPP
Investment Board <https://cdn1.cppinvestments.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/CPP-Investments2019-sustainable-investing-report-v5-en-1.pdf> [CPPIB, “2019 Sustainable Investing Report”].
54.  Canada Pension Plan Investment Board, “Report on Sustainable Investing: Investing
Responsibility for CPP Contributors and Beneficiaries” (2018) at 14, online (pdf ): CPP Investmenr
Board <https://www.cppinvestments.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/CPPIB_SI_2018_ENG1.pdf>.
55.  OTPP, “2018 Climate Change Report”, supra note 37 at 2.
56.  See CPPIB, “Approach to Climate Change”, supra note 33; OTPP, “2018 RI Report”,
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BCIMC’s Climate Action Plan, which provides that “the most effective way
to manage climate investment impacts is to integrate climate considerations
into every investment decision”.57 The fund seeks to achieve this goal through
a range of activities such as encouraging credit rating agencies to incorporate
climate analysis into their ratings as well as factoring climate considerations
into active equity mandates and private equity investments.58 The BCIMC is
also planning to test a carbon pricing model and conduct a climate materiality
assessment for its asset classes in the future.59
However, although integrating climate considerations into the investment
process is an important climate strategy, it can only work if pension funds
have obtained the necessary climate-related information from their investee
companies. Nevertheless, this prerequisite is yet to materialize as corporate
disclosure on climate change remains largely inadequate and fragmented.
Disclosure requirements for public issuers are governed by provincial securities
laws and regulations which revolve around the concept of materiality.60 An
issuer must disclose all material information in the prospectus that it files with
the relevant securities regulators as well as all subsequent continuous disclosure
instruments, such as the Annual Information Form (AIF) and Management’s
Discussion & Analysis (MD&A).61 Securities legislation considers the
information to be material when it “would reasonably be expected to have a
significant effect on the market price or value of the securities” or when it
“would be considered important by a reasonable investor in determining
whether to purchase or continue to hold securities of the issuer”.62 Similarly,
the Environmental Reporting Guidance that has been issued by the Canadian
Securities Administrators (CSA) provides that “[i]nformation relating to
environmental matters is likely material if a reasonable investor’s decision
supra note 28 at 28; CDPQ, “2018 Stewardship Investing Report”, supra note 51 at 9; BCIMC,
“Climate Action Plan”, supra note 35 at 3; PSPIB, “2019 RI Report”, supra note 33 at 27.
57.  BCIMC, “Climate Action Plan”, supra note 35 at 6.
58.  See ibid.
59.  See ibid.
60.  The disclosure requirements have been largely harmonized across Canada through
national instruments and policies. See Canadian Securities Administrators (CSA), “Access Rules
and Policies” (last visited 13 October 2019), online: Canadian Securities Administrators <www.
securities-administrators.ca/industry_resources.aspx?id=47>.
61.  For disclosure obligations of securities issuers, refer to information under “Prospectus
Offerings” and “Continuous Disclosure” headings on the Ontario Securities Commission
website. See Ontario Securities Commission, online: Ontario Securities Commission <www.osc.
gov.on.ca/en/home.htm>.
62.  Material fact and material change are defined in securities legislation. See e.g. Securities
Act, RSA 2000, c S-4, s 1(ff); Securities Act, RSBC 1996, c 418, s 1(1); Securities Act, RSO 1990,
c S.5, s 1(1) [Securities Act (Ont)]; Securities Act, RSQ c V-1.1, s 5.3.
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whether or not to buy, sell or hold securities of the issuer would likely
be influenced or changed if the information was omitted or misstated.”63
In terms of continuous disclosure, a reporting issuer needs to disclose material
information in a timely manner. As such, any “material change” in business,
operations, or capital of the reporting issuer must be disclosed “as soon as
practicable”.64
Given that these definitions and concepts, such as “significant impact” or
“reasonable expectation”, do not provide a bright line test, materiality remains
a highly contextual concept with its meaning varying across industries, issuers,
and time horizons.65 The CSA counsels issuers to err on the side of caution
and to disclose the information “if there is any doubt about whether particular
information is material”.66 Despite this call for caution and the fact that
omitting material information from disclosure documents attracts civil liability,
reporting on climate change-related information remains largely inadequate in
Canada. A 2017 study by the Chartered Professional Accountants of Canada
(CPA) of seventy-five TSX-listed companies, representing seventy-eight per
cent of the S&P/TSX Composite Index, found significant gaps in issuers’
securities filings. The study revealed that most climate-related disclosures
lacked sufficient context to allow users to understand the implications of
climate change for companies’ business models and financial results.67 Less than
a third of companies made specific disclosure of board and senior management
oversight of climate-related issues, and only a quarter disclosed a proactive
strategy on transitioning to a low-carbon economy. Few companies provided
meaningful analysis of the impact of climate change on their businesses and
financial results. The study also shows that climate-related disclosures are based
on inconsistent methodologies and vary significantly in nature and scope across
different sectors.68
Similar gaps emerged in a subsequent study by the CSA on disclosure
practices of seventy-eight reporting issuers from the S&P/TSX Composite
63.  CSA Staff Notice 51-333 – Environmental Reporting Guidance, OSC CSA Staff Notice, (27
October 2010) at 4, online (pdf ): <www.osc.gov.on.ca/documents/en/Securities-Category5/
csa_20101027_51-333_environmental-reporting.pdf>.
64.  See e.g. Securities Act (Ont), supra note 61, s 75(2).
65.  National Policy 51-201 Disclosure Standards, OSC NP 51-201, (2002) 25 OSCB 4492, s
4.2(1), online: <www.osc.gov.on.ca/en/SecuritiesLaw_pol_20020712_51-201.jsp>.
66.  Ibid, s 4.2(2).
67.  See CPA Canada, “State of Play: Study of Climate-Related Disclosures by Canadian
Public Companies” (2017) at 2–3, online: Chartered Professional Accountants of Canada <www.
cpacanada.ca/en/business-and-accounting-resources/financial-and-non-financial-reporting/
sustainability-environmental-and-social-reporting/publications/climate-related-disclosurestudy>.
68.  See ibid.
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Index.69 The CSA Staff Notice 51-354 Report on Climate Change-related
Disclosure (April 2018) found that forty-four per cent of issuers either do not
provide any climate-related disclosure or only provide boiler-plate disclosure.70
The CSA’s report observed that the “most prevalent reason” given by issuers
for non-disclosure was that the climate-related information “is not material to
them at this time”.71 However, this view, as acknowledged by the CSA, clearly
contradicts the view by users of information, such as institutional investors that
consider climate risk an important financial and not merely a “sustainability or
environmental issue”.72
After recognizing the issues around materiality, the CSA published Staff
Notice 51-358 Reporting of Climate Change-related Risks on August 1,
2019, in an effort to promote climate-related disclosure.73 Although the notice
provides guidance to reporting issuers, the guidance is at a high level and
does not provide specific steps for companies to take. For instance, the CSA
encourages “issuers to undertake an analysis before concluding they have no
material exposure to climate change-related risks” without expanding on the
type of analysis required.74 Nonetheless, the effects of this staff notice will be
uncovered through the upcoming rounds of disclosure reporting.
The lack of climate-related disclosure by companies poses significant
challenges for pension funds, which ultimately rely on investee companies for
information so that they can assess and manage the impact of climate change
on their portfolios. In its October 2018 interim report, the Canadian Expert
Panel on Sustainable Finance acknowledged this problem, noting that during
the consultations, “[a]sset owners saw better disclosures by their underlying
portfolio companies not only as a key source of decision information but also as
an essential input” to their reporting and risk management efforts.75 Although
the CSA’s staff notice is helpful in drawing attention to serious shortcomings

69.  See CSA Staff Notice 51-354 - Report on Climate Change-related Disclosure Project, OSC
CSA Staff Notice, (5 April 2018), online:<www.osc.gov.on.ca/documents/en/SecuritiesCategory5/csa_20180405_climate-change-related-disclosure-project.pdf>.
70.  See ibid at 13.
71.  Ibid at 16.
72.  Ibid at 15–16.
73.  CSA Staff Notice, 51-358—Reporting of Climate Change-related Risks, OSC CSA
Staff Notice, (1 August 2019), online (pdf ): <www.osc.gov.on.ca/documents/en/SecuritiesCategory5/csa_20190801_51-358_reporting-of-climate-change-related-risks.pdf>.
74.  Ibid at 8.
75.  Expert Panel, Interim Report, supra note 8 at 31.

M. Peihani

19

in companies’ disclosure practices on climate change, it falls short of providing
any guidance or reforms to address these shortcomings. The regulatory vacuum
stands in sharp contrast to reforms in other jurisdictions, which have mandated
corporate disclosure on climate change.76
C. Investments in Renewable Energy
Another common theme among the pension funds’ climate strategies
is increasing investment in renewable energy and clean technology. The
“responsible” or “stewardship” reports of all five funds indicate that they are
actively pursuing clean investments, a trend which has been reinforced by the
cost competitiveness of renewables. The BCIMC, for example, reports that as
of March 2017, it has invested roughly CAD 1.8 billion in “climate-related
opportunities across all asset classes”.77 As of March 31, 2019, PSPIB has more
than CAD 5 billion of direct investments in more than 130 renewable energy
assets with an aggregated net power capacity of 3.5 gigawatts. Both the CPPIB
and OTPP are also actively exploring attractive risk-adjusted returns in the
transition to a lower-carbon economy and mention in their reports recent
significant transactions in renewables, clean technology, and energy efficiency.78
Nevertheless, the search for climate-friendly investments has not yet
translated to a parallel transition from carbon-intensive energy sources and the
Canadian pension sector remains heavily invested in fossil fuels. The CPPIB’s
Approach to Climate Change is particularly illustrative in this respect. It
maintains that “[a]t this time, fossil fuels remain an important sector of the
global economy”, and the CPPIB explores “opportunities in the renewable
energy sector in a thoughtful, prudent manner”.79 The fund, therefore,
continues investing, particularly through its private equity arm, in oil and gas
assets across Canada and the United States.80

76.  An important example is Article 173 of France’s Energy Transition Law (2015), which
requires public companies and institutional investors to disclose climate-related physical and
transition risks. See Emilie Mazzacurati, “Art. 173: France’s Groundbreaking Climate Risk
Reporting Law” (16 January 2017), online: Four Twenty-Seven <427mt.com/2017/01/16/
impact-french-law-article-173/>.
77.  BCIMC, “Climate Action Plan”, supra note 35 at 7.
78.  See CPPIB, “2019 Sustainable Investing Report”, supra note 53 at 26–27; OTPP, “2018
RI Report”, supra note 28 at 27.
79.  CPPIB, “Approach to Climate Change”, supra note 33.
80.  See Hamish Stewart, “The Canada Pension Plan’s Love Affair With Big Oil”, Opinion,
Canada’s National Observer (8 August 2016), online: <www.nationalobserver.com/2016/08/01/
news/canada-pension-plan-shell-companies-and-busiest-man-canada>.
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Similarly, the OTPP maintains that while the climate change risks to
its portfolio are real, it believes that “engagement with companies is a more
effective tool for managing climate change than divestment”.81 Thus, the
OTPP continues to hold outsized investments in the fossil fuel sector and was
estimated in 2015 to have the highest carbon exposure in the Canadian pension
sector.82 In the same year, the OTPP paid CAD 3.3 billion to acquire Cenovus
Energy Inc.’s oil and gas royalty business in Western Canada.83 The transaction
occurred when oil prices were falling and major international conglomerates,
such as Royal Dutch Shell, were exiting the oil sands business in Canada.84
Marc Lee and Justin Ritchie estimate that the OTPP lost over CAD 1.768
billion on its fossil fuel sector stocks as a result of oil prices slumping in the
second half of 2014.85 Similarly, significant exposure to the fossil fuel sector can
also be observed at the BCIMC, which held over CAD 3.2 billion in equity in
publicly traded fossil fuel companies as of March 2016.86 Observing the fund’s
substantial exposure to Alberta oil sands, Yunker, Dempsey & Rowe estimate
that the fund has invested over CAD 782 million in Enbridge (Canada’s
largest pipeline company), as well as CAD 526 million in Suncor (an oil sands
producer) and CAD 457 million in the TransCanada Corporation (which
operates the Keystone XL pipeline).87

81.  Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan, “2019 Climate Change Report” (2019) at 6, online (pdf ):
Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan <www.otpp.com/documents/10179/1021270/2019+Climate+
Change+Report/f3eae93f-7531-440e-92ea-91275ec52980> [OTPP, “2019 Climate Change
Report”].
82.  See Marc Lee & Justin Ritchie, “Pension Funds and Fossil Fuels: The Economic
Case for Divestment” (17 November 2015) at 39, online (pdf ): Canadian Centre for Policy
Alternatives <www.policyalternatives.ca/sites/default/files/uploads/publications/National%20
Office%2C%20BC%20Office/2015/11/Pension_Funds_and_Fossil_Fuels.pdf>.
83.  See Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan, “Ontario Teachers’ to Acquire Cenovus Oil and Gas
Royalty Business” (30 June 2015), online: Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan <www.otpp.com/
news/article/-/article/739022>.
84.  See Adria Vasil, “Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan Faced with Growing Pressure to Divest
from Fossil Fuels”, Now Toronto (11 March 2017), online: <nowtoronto.com/lifestyle/ecoholic/
ontario-teachers%27-pension-fund-divestment-fossil-fuels/>.
85.  See Lee & Ritchie, supra note 82 at 39.
86.  See Zoë Yunker, Jessica Dempsey & James Rowe, “Canada’s Fossil-Fuelled Pensions: The
Case of the British Columbia Investment Management Corporation” (June 2018) at 14, online
(pdf ): Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives <www.policyalternatives.ca/sites/default/files/
uploads/publications/BC%20Office/2018/06/CCPA-BC%20BCI%20FINAL.pdf>.
87.  See ibid.
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The funds’ exposure to carbon-intensive sectors can be partly explained by
the importance of resource extraction to the Canadian economy, combined
with the uncertainty surrounding the timing of climate-related physical and
transition risks. It must be, however, noted that the pension sector cannot just
embrace an orderly transition to the lower-carbon economy by making modest
investments in clean energy while at the same time continuing business as usual
in carbon-intensive sectors. The Paris Agreement’s 2°C to 1.5°C temperature
goal significantly limits the additional amount of GHG emissions that can
be released between now and the end of the century, which is known as the
carbon budget. According to the latest report by the Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change (IPCC), if the atmosphere absorbs more than 420 gigatons
(Gt) of CO2, then the chances of limiting temperature rise to 1.5°C would fall
below sixty-six per cent.88 If emissions continue at the current pace, this carbon
budget will be exhausted in just under nine years. The 2°C carbon budget is
1170 Gt, which will be exhausted in just twenty-six years—well before the
middle of the twenty-first century.89
The remaining limited carbon budget means that a large proportion
of proven fossil fuel reserves must stay underground. A recent study by Oil
Change International, for instance, finds that there is a likely (sixty-six per cent)
chance of keeping the temperature increase below 2°C if sixty-eight per cent
of global fossil fuel reserves remain unburned. The same study finds that there
is a medium chance (fifty per cent) of keeping the temperature increase below
1.5°C if eighty-five per cent of global fossil fuel reserves remain unburned.90
Looking at Canada’s fair share of the global carbon budget, it is estimated that
a sixty-six per cent chance of staying below 2°C and a fifty per cent chance
of staying below 1.5°C respectively require seventy per cent and eighty-six

88.  See IPCC, “Summary for Policymakers”, supra note 3 at 12. The IPCC special report
shows that the worst effects of climate change can only be avoided if global warming is limited
to 1.5°C. To achieve this target, CO2 emissions must be cut forty-five per cent by 2030, which
would require “rapid and far-reaching transitions” in energy, land, transport, and infrastructure.
See ibid at 13.
89.  See Mercator Research Institute on Global Commons and Climate Change, “Remaining
Carbon Budget: That’s How Fast the Carbon Clock Is Ticking” (last visited 13 October 2019),
online: Mercator Research Institute on Global Commons and Climate Change <www.mcc-berlin.
net/en/research/co2-budget.html>.
90.  See Greg Muttitt et al, “The Sky’s Limit: Why the Paris Climate Goals Require a Managed
Decline of Fossil Fuel Production” (September 2016) at 6, online (pdf ): Oil Change International
<priceofoil.org/content/uploads/2016/09/OCI_the_skys_limit_2016_FINAL_2.pdf>.
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per cent of Canada’s known fossil fuel reserves to stay underground.91 Thus, to the
extent that the fossil fuel reserves are in excess of the remaining carbon budget,
their extraction and production will be inconsistent with the commitments
under the Paris Agreement and can pose important physical and transition risks
to corresponding equity investments. As long-term investors with a fiduciary
duty to invest in the best interest of their beneficiaries, the pension funds need
to diligently consider the carbon risks of their investments. This duty can be
reasonably inferred from the statutory requirement of prudent investing, which
requires pension funds to invest in a prudent manner and monitor and mitigate
the material risks to their investments.92
D. Climate Metrics and Targets
As recommended by the TCFD, an important way to achieve alignment
with the Paris Agreement is by using clear metrics and targets to assess and
manage climate risks and opportunities. In the Canadian context, the most
commonly used climate metric is the carbon footprint, a term broadly used
to describe the GHG emissions associated with investment portfolios.93 The
CDPQ’s climate strategy stands out as an interesting model in this respect.
In addition to integrating climate change into their investment process and
engaging with companies on climate change, the CDPQ is committed to
reducing its carbon footprint by twenty-five per cent by 2025 and increasing its
low-carbon investments by fifty per cent by 2020.94
The CDPQ is also the first fund that has measured and disclosed the carbon
intensity of its entire portfolio, including equities, fixed income, infrastructure,
and real estate.95 As of December 2017, the carbon intensity of the CDPQ’s
portfolio was seventy-nine metric tonnes of CO2 equivalent (tCO2e) per
million dollars invested. The fund has pledged to reduce this figure to fiftynine tCO2e by 2025 and publicly discloses its annual progress in meeting
91.  See Marc Lee, “Extracted Carbon: Re-examining Canada’s Contribution to Climate
Change through Fossil Fuel Exports” (25 January 2017) at 18–19, online (pdf ): Canadian Centre
for Policy Alternatives <www.policyalternatives.ca/sites/default/files/uploads/publications/
National%20Office%2C%20BC%20Office/2017/01/ccpa_extracted_carbon_web.pdf>.
92.  See e.g. Pension Benefits Act (Ont), supra note 23, s 22. See also Sarra, supra note 13 at
48–49.
93.  For background on carbon foot-printing and associated terms, see Valéry Lucas-Leclin et
al, “Carbon Intensity ≠ Carbon Risk Exposure” (November 2015), online (pdf ): <2degreesinvesting.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/Carbon-intensity-vs.-carbon-risk-exposureNovember-2015.pdf>.
94.  See CDPQ, “2018 Stewardship Investing Report”, supra note 52 at 9.
95.  See ibid at 12–13.
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this target.96 Other pension funds seem to have followed suit. The CPPIB and
OTPP have developed a carbon footprint for their public equity portfolios,
which respectively stand at 107 tCO2e per million dollars and 283 tCO2e per
million dollars.97 Although the BCIMC and the PSPIB currently lack a way
to measure their carbon footprint, they have both reported working toward
developing this tool.98
Finally, scenario analysis assessing the financial resilience under various
plausible global warming scenarios seems to be slowly gaining momentum. A
noteworthy example is the BCIMC’s scenario analysis, which relies upon the
Climate Change Risk Assessment Package developed by Mercer.99 The fund
has started assessing its long-term returns, over a fifteen-year horizon, under
both the 2°C and 4°C warming scenarios.100 Both the CPPIB and OTPP also
report their staffs are working on assessing how their portfolios will perform
under different climate scenarios, ranging from a low-carbon to a high-carbon
world.101 In a similar development, the CDPQ has joined a United Nations
Environment Programme Finance Initiative (UNEP FI) task force to collaborate
on developing the appropriate methodology for conducting a scenario analysis
of its total portfolio.102
From the relatively scarce detail in the funds’ disclosure documents, climate
change scenario analysis is at the early stages of development in the Canadian
financial sector. It is a different and notably more challenging exercise than
mainstream financial risk management, which typically focuses on short-term
horizons and seeks to extrapolate future outcomes from historical data.103
96.  See ibid at 13.
97.  See CPPIB, “2019 Sustainable Investing Report”, supra note 53 at 61; OTPP, “2018
Climate Change Report”, supra note 37 at 22.
98.  See BCIMC, “Climate Action Plan”, supra note 35 at 5; PSPIB, “2019 RI Report”, supra
note 33 at 20.
99.  See BCIMC, “Climate Action Plan”, supra note 35 at 15.
100.  The BCIMC’s assessment suggests that the funds’ annual average returns (over a 15-year
horizon) will decline by 0.14 per cent under a 2°C scenario and 0.16 per cent under a 4°C
warming scenario. See ibid.
101.  See CPPIB, “2019 Sustainable Investing Report”, supra note 53 at 15; OTPP, “2018 RI
Report”, supra note 28 at 27.
102.  See CDPQ, “2018 Stewardship Investing Report”, supra note 52 at 40.
103.  See e.g. Generation Foundation & 2° Investing Initiative, “All Swans Are Black in The
Dark: How the Short-Term Focus of Financial Analysis Does Not Shed Light on Long-Term
Risks” (February 2017) at 41, 45, online (pdf ): Generation Foundation & 2° Investing Initiative
<degreesilz.cluster023.hosting.ovh.net/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/All-swans-are-black-inthe-dark-how-the-short-term-focus-of-financial-analysis-does-not-shed-light-on-long-termrisks-2017-.pdf>; Expert Panel, Final Report, supra note 40 at 14–15.

24

(2020) 46:1 Queen’s LJ

Climate-related risks can unfold over a considerably long time frame, and
historical data may not be necessarily helpful in forecasting the magnitude
and scale of losses that arise from global warming and the associated extreme
weather events. Despite these challenges, scenario analysis can still be an
important tool to help boards and senior management develop a robust longterm climate strategy. In the Canadian context, better corporate disclosure on
climate change, as well as greater policy certainty on transitioning to a lowercarbon economy, can certainly contribute to more effective applications of
scenario analysis. As will be discussed later, the existing environment of policy
uncertainty inevitably affects the financial system’s outlook on climate change
and the aptitude for translating climate risks into future financial outcomes.

III. Engagement and Advocacy
Canadian pension funds do not screen or exclude any investments based
solely on ESG factors.104 As long as a company’s business is lawful, it is deemed
to be an eligible investment opportunity, even though it presents significant
ESG risks to the portfolio.105 This approach is grounded in the belief that
if a pension fund divests from a company because of its poor ESG profile,
others will step in and acquire its holdings. In this scenario, the funds not
only lose lucrative returns but also lose their voice, since shareholders can no
longer exercise a positive influence over a company’s affairs.106 Divestment is
also seen as inconsistent with the pension funds’ “investment only” mandate
and fiduciary duty, which require them to earn maximum financial returns for
their beneficiaries.107
Alternatively, pension funds use engagement to reconcile their investment
decisions with their responsible investment goals. Corporate engagement

104.  See e.g. CPPIB, “RI Policy”, supra note 28 at 2; BCIMC, “RI Approach”, supra note 28
at 3; CDPQ, “RI Policy”, supra note 28 at 5; PSPIB, “RI Policy”, supra note 28 at 5.
105.  Although the CDPQ mentions “exclusion” in its RI Policy, it goes on to explain that
exclusion is used only “in unusual circumstances, particularly when products of a company
are prohibited by legislation applicable to Canada or through international agreements”. See
CDPQ, “RI Policy”, supra note 28 at 5. Thus, it seems that ESG factors on their own, and in
the absence of illegality, would not justify divestment.
106.  See OTPP, “2018 RI Report”, supra note 28 at 12. See also Benjamin J Richardson,
“Divesting from Climate Change: The Road to Influence” (2017) 39:4 Law & Pol’y, 325 at
335.
107.  For instance, BCIMC notes that its mandate does not permit it to “select or exclude
investments based solely on environmental, social, governance, or value-based considerations”.
See BCIMC, “RI Approach”, supra note 28 at 3.
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encourages active ownership and monitoring of portfolio companies rather than
passive ownership and trading of shares.108 Engagement is a central theme in
socially responsible investment (SRI) theories, such as fiduciary capitalism and
universal ownership, which highlight the asset owners’ unique role in addressing
social and environmental risks. These theories posit that the fiduciary duty of
asset owners, coupled with their diverse portfolios and long-term perspectives,
position them well to act on ESG issues that could otherwise escape the shortterm horizon of other investors.109
The global financial crisis (GFC) of 2008 further drew attention to
engagement as institutional investors failed to monitor and curb the excessive
risk-taking that dominated the financial sector in the pre-crisis era.110 Pension
funds were particularly hit hard by the GFC, losing USD 3.5 trillion of assets
in 2008.111 The Canadian pension sector lost twenty per cent of its assets
with losses being particularly heavy among the funds active in risky market
domains, such as structured finance.112 The crisis then marked a policy shift
108.  See OECD, G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance (Paris: OECD Publishing,
2015) at 29; Mark Fenwick & Erik PM Vermeulen, “Institutional Investor Engagement: How
to Create a ‘Stewardship Culture’” (2018) Lex Research Topics in Corporate Law & Economics
Working Paper No 2018-1 at 11, online: SSRN <ssrn.com/abstract=3098235>.
109.  See Robert Monks & Allen Sykes, Capitalism Without Owners Will Fail: A Policymaker’s
Guide to Reform, (New York: The Centre for the Study of Financial Innovation, 2002) at
31–32; Steven Lydenberg, “Universal Investors and Socially Responsible Investors: A Tale of
Emerging Affinities” (2007) 15 Corporate Governance: An Intl Rev 467 at 475; James Hawley
& Andrew Williams, “The Emergence of Universal Owners: Some Implications of Institutional
Equity Ownership” (2000) 43:4 Challenge 43 at 45; Raj Thamotheram & Helen Wildsmith,
“Putting the Universal Owner Hypothesis into Action: Why Large Retirement Funds Should
Want to Collectively Increase Overall Market Returns and What They Can Do About It”
(last visited 14 October 2019) at 5–6, 10–11, online (pdf ): ICPM <www.icpmnetwork.com/
wp-content/uploads/2016/04/Putting_the_Universal_Owner_Hypothesis_into_Action_Raj_
Thamotheram_and_Helen_Wildsmith.pdf>.
110.  See Financial Services Authority, “The Turner Review – A Regulatory Response to the
Global Banking Crisis” (March 2009) at 46, online (pdf ): Financial Services Authority <http://
www.actuaries.org/CTTEES_TFRISKCRISIS/Documents/turner_review.pdf>. See also “The
Kay Review of UK Equity Markets and Long-Term Decision Making Final Report” (July 2012)
at para 5.28, online (pdf ): Government of the United Kingdom <www.gov.uk/government/news/
kay-review-publishes-report-on-uk-financial-sector>.
111.  See Brian Keeley & Patrick Love, From Crisis to Recovery: The Causes, Course and
Consequences of the Great Recession (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2010) at 71.
112.  See ibid at 71–72. The CDPQ, for instance, suffered significant losses on its investments
in the third-party asset-backed commercial paper which froze in August 2007. See John Chant,
“The ABCP Crisis in Canada: The Implications for the Regulation of Financial Markets”
(2008) at 37, online (pdf ): Expert Panel on Securities Regulation <expertpanel.ca/documents/
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to promote engagement, leading to widespread adoption of stewardship codes
and best practices. Investee companies demanded institutional investors engage
in a “purposeful dialogue” with them on matters of corporate governance, risk
management, strategy, and compensation.113 Initiatives such as the European
Institutional Investors Group on Climate Change (IIGCC) and the global
Climate Action 100+ have been set up for investor collaboration to ensure
that investees take action on climate change.114 In Canada, the Stewardship
Principles call on institutional investors to focus on generating “long-term
sustainable value”, monitoring and engaging with investee companies on issues
that could affect the company’s value, including material ESG factors.115 To
further Canada’s efforts on climate change, the Stewardship Principles can
further call on Canadian institutional investors to emulate the IIGCC model
by creating a national Canadian-led investor initiative driving dialogue with
investees on the specific climate-related issues in Canada.
Engagement has become the dominant method among Canadian pension
funds to address climate risk. Engagement is achieved either directly through
dialogue with a company’s board and management, or indirectly through
proxy voting and shareholder resolutions. The CPPIB, for example, engages

/research-studies/The%20ABCP%20Crisis%20in%20Canada%20-%20Chant.English.pdf>;
World Bank, supra note 18 at 23.
113.  Financial Reporting Council, “The UK Stewardship Code” (2012) at 9, online (pdf ):
Financial Reporting Council <www.frc.org.uk/getattachment/d67933f9-ca38-4233-b6033d24b2f62c5f/UK-Stewardship-Code-(September-2012).pdf>. See also European Commission,
“Green Paper: Long-Term Financing of the European Economy” (25 March 2013) at 10, online
(pdf ): European Commission <eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:9df9914f-6c89-48da9c53-d9d6be7099fb.0009.03/DOC_1&format=PDF>; Terry McNulty & Donald Nordberg,
“Ownership, Activism and Engagement: Institutional Investors as Active Owners” (2016) 24:3
Corporate Governance: An Intl Rev 346 at 350.
114.  Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan, “2017 Responsible Investing Report” (2017), online (pdf ):
Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan <www.otpp.com/documents/10179/786418/-/b61561d3-c2854f2e-bebc-0aa252bf4ff6/2017%20Responsible%20Investing%20Report.pdf>; The Institutional
Investors Group on Climate Change (last visited 19 December 2019), online: IIGCC <www.
iigcc.org/>; Climate Action 100+, “Global Investors Driving Business Transition” (last visited 19
December 2019), online: Climate Action 100+ <www.climateaction100.org/>.
115.  Canadian Coalition for Good Governance, “Stewardship Principles” (2017) at 2, online:
Canadian Coalition for Good Governance <ccgg.ca/policies/>.

M. Peihani

27

with portfolio companies that have high GHG emissions to discuss strategies
that could help them reduce their emissions.116 In 2018–2019, the CPPIB
supported over thirty shareholder proposals on climate change in its investee
companies.117 In addition, the fund encourages companies to adopt best
practices on climate disclosure, such as the TCFD recommendations or the
Climate Change Information Request (formerly the Carbon Disclosure
Project).118
Engagement is similarly an important principle of the OTPP’s approach
to climate change. The OTPP does not divest from high emitters, such as
fossil fuel companies, but engages with them to understand how they address
their climate risks and encourages them to proactively position themselves for
the transition to a low-carbon economy.119 The fund supports shareholders’
resolutions for better disclosure and action on climate change if its analysis
suggests room for improvement. In 2017–2018, the fund voted for thirty-six
environmental shareholder proposals and participated in the Climate Action
100+ initiative to engage with the world’s highest GHG corporate emitters.120
Similar practices can be found among the CDPQ, PSPIB, and BCIMC. These
funds also rely on engaging with portfolio companies, exercising voting rights,
and participating in industry initiatives to improve climate disclosure and
action.121
A. Revisiting Engagement’s Potential in Addressing Climate Risks
Although engagement is a necessary strategy to address climate risk, its
potential to effect change should be viewed with caution.122 This is particularly
the case regarding engagement with companies in carbon-intensive sectors, such
as fossil fuels, where the core business of the company involves CO2 emissions.
In Canada, for example, the oil and gas sector is the largest GHG contributor,
accounting for twenty-six per cent of the country’s total emissions.123 So, while
116.  See CPPIB, “Approach to Climate Change”, supra note 33.
117.  See CPPIB, “2019 Annual Report”, supra note 35 at 73.
118.  See ibid at 28, 40.
119.  See OTPP, “2019 Climate Change Report”, supra note 81 at 6; OTPP, “2018 RI Report”,
supra note 28 at 16.
120.  See OTPP, “2018 RI Report”, supra note 28 at 16, 18.
121.  See BCIMC, “Climate Action Plan”, supra note 35 at 8–9; PSPIB, “2019 RI Report”,
supra note 33 at 20; CDPQ, “2018 Stewardship Investing Report”, supra note 52 at 15.
122.  See Richardson, supra note 106 at 337–38.
123.  See Government of Canada, “Greenhouse Gas Emissions” (6 June 2018), online:
Government of Canada <www.canada.ca/en/environment-climate-change/services/
environmental-indicators/greenhouse-gas-emissions.html>.
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engagement can help catalyze better climate risk disclosure by these companies,
it cannot change the carbon-intensive nature of their business.
On a fundamental level, there is a tension between engagement and the
pension funds’ investment strategies, which are heavily influenced by the
Modern Portfolio Theory (MPT). The MPT suggests that optimal investment
returns come from a properly diversified portfolio of securities. According to
MPT, diversification reduces risk through distribution and does not sacrifice
expected returns.124 The dominance of the MPT in financial markets has led
many institutional investors to follow extreme diversification, such as holding
securities in numerous listed companies, which replicates major market indices.
The CPPIB, for instance, holds shares in over 2,700 public companies listed in
forty-five jurisdictions.125 Due to the sheer size and diversity of the portfolio,
proactive engagement for a sustainable transition is only feasible in a fraction
of cases.126
Finally, engagement is only used in the context of equity portfolios, leaving
out debt investments that comprise a significant portion of pension funds’
investments. For instance, in 2017–2018 the CPPIB and CDPQ held over
CAD 75 billion and CAD 94 billion in fixed-income securities, respectively
comprising nineteen per cent and thirty per cent of their portfolios.127 However,
neither of these pension funds nor other funds studied in this paper seem to
engage with their corporate borrowers on climate change or ESG issues.
The exclusive focus on shareholder engagement seems to reflect the
traditional shareholder primary model, which assigns corporate governance to
shareholders.128 Under this view, shareholders have a direct stake in the firm
and can influence the firm’s governance through appointment or removal of
directors. Creditors, on the other hand, are believed to have significantly less
stake since their claims to principal and interest are protected by insolvency law.
124.  See Harry Markowitz, “Portfolio Selection” (1952) 7:1 J Finance 77 at 89; Jaap Winter,
“Shareholder Engagement and Stewardship: The Realities and Illusions of Institutional Share
Ownership” (2011) at 3, online: SSRN <ssrn.com/abstract=1867564>.
125.  See Canadian Pension Plan Investment Board, “Proxy Voting: Engaging Public
Companies to Drive Long-Term Value” (8 March 2017), online: The Canada Pension Plan
Investment Board <www.cppib.com/en/public-media/headlines/2017/proxy-voting-engagingpublic-companies-drive-long-term-value/>.
126.  See Benjamin Richardson & Maziar Peihani, “Universal Investors and Socially Responsible
Finance: A Critique of a Premature Theory” (2015) 30:3 BFLR 405 at 436.
127.  See CPPIB, “2019 Annual Report”, supra note 35 at 17; Caisse du Dépôt et Placement
du Québec,, “2018 Annual Report” (2019) at 15, online (pdf ): <www.cdpq.com/sites/default/
files/medias/pdf/en/ra/ra2018_rapport_annuel_en.pdf>.
128.  See Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, “A Survey of Corporate Governance” (1997) 52:2
J Finance 737 at 752–53. See also Steven Schwarcz, “Rethinking Corporate Governance for a
Bondholder Financed, Systemically Risky World,” (2017) 58:4 Wm & Mary L Rev 1345 at 1352–353.
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Creditors, therefore, are seen as passive bystanders until the firm is in a “bad
state” and defaults on its debt.129 This classic view of corporate governance,
however, sits at odds with the rising significance of bond markets as a primary
source of corporate finance as well as the strong influence that bondholders can
wield over their borrowers. In their study of a large sample of US non-financial
firms, Nini et al found that violations of bond covenants130 are followed by a
decline in acquisitions and capital expenditures, a sharp reduction in dividend
payouts, and an increase in senior management turnover.131 Creditors can,
therefore, influence the policies and behaviours of debtor companies, which in
turn calls into question the rationale for restricting governance to shareholders.
A shareholder-centric model of governance also does not seem to enjoy
strong support in the Canadian legal jurisprudence. In 2019, the Parliament
of Canada amended the federal corporations act to enumerate a list of other
stakeholders that directors and officers may consider when acting in the best
interests of the corporation.132 The addition of section 122(1.1)(b) to the
Canada Business Corporation Act expressly states that directors may consider
environmental factors when acting in the best interests of the corporation.133
However, the legislature provides little guidance for directors on when and
how they should consider environmental factors. Furthermore, consideration
of environmental factors does not mean that directors necessarily must act
on them. Nonetheless, Parliament’s amendment codifies previous case law.
In Peoples Department Stores Inc (Trustee of ) v Wise, the Supreme Court of
Canada held that the “best interests of the corporation” does not simply mean
the “best interest of the shareholders”, and the directors can take into account
the interests of a broad range of stakeholders, including “employees, suppliers,
creditors, consumers, governments and the environment”.134 The Court
affirmed this reasoning in BCE Inc v 1976 Debentureholders, holding that the
129.  See Shleifer & Vishny, supra note 128 at 762.
130.  Bond covenants are contractual provisions which seek to reduce agency costs and
shield creditors against actions that could lower the borrower firm’s value. Common examples
of covenants include merger restrictions, asset sale restrictions, cross-default provisions, and
secured debt restrictions. For further discussion, Marcel Kahan & David Yermack, “Investment
Opportunities and the Design of Debt Securities” (1998) 14:1 JL Econ & Org 136 at 138;
Serdar Çelik et al, “Corporate Bonds, Bondholders and Corporate Governance” (2015) OECD
Corporate Governance Working Papers No 16 at 43–45, online: OECD iLibrary <dx.doi.
org/10.1787/5js69lj4hvnw-en>.
131.  See Greg Nini et al, “Creditor Control Rights, Corporate Governance, and Firm Value”
(2012) 25:6 Rev Financial Studies 1713 at 1715–716.
132.  See Budget Implementation Act, 2019, No 1, SC 2019, c 29, s 141.
133.  RSC 1985, c C-44, s 122(1.1)(b).
134.  2004 SCC 68 at para 42.
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corporate directors need to treat all stakeholders, and not just shareholders,
“in a fair manner, commensurate with the corporation’s duties as a responsible
corporate citizen”.135
Accordingly, there seems to be no strong legal or empirical reason to restrict
corporate engagement on ESG issues to equity investments. As lenders of
capital, Canadian pension funds could and should engage with the corporate
borrowers to drive better disclosure and management of ESG issues. As on
equity investments, climate change can have an important impact on a bond’s
valuations and returns, as well as the borrower’s creditworthiness.136 This is
particularly the case with respect to long-term bonds, which will most likely be
affected by the physical and transition risks of climate change in future decades.

IV. Remaining Challenges and the Path Forward
Canadian institutional investors do not enjoy an international reputation for
climate leadership. The Asset Owners Disclosure Project (AODP) assigned a “D”
score to the Canadian asset owners (pension funds and insurers) in 2017.137 In
contrast, asset owners in Europe—particularly Scandinavian countries, France
and the Netherlands—as well as Australia and New Zealand received the highest
score for their progressive approach to climate change.138 The Swedish pension
fund, Fjärde AP-Fonden (AP4), which stands out for its leadership on climate
change, is worthwhile to note here. The fund adopted a low-carbon investment
strategy as early as 2012 and is a co-founder of the Portfolio Decarbonization
Coalition (PDC), which to date has mobilized more than USD 800 billion

135.  2008 SCC 69 at para 82.
136.  See Principles for Responsible Investment, “About the PRI” (last visited 14 October
2019), online: United Nations’ Principles for Responsible Investment <www.unpri.org/pri>. In
fact, the Principles for Responsible Investment (PRI) call for appropriate ESG disclosure in
all investee entities, including both equity and debt investments. See PRI, “ESG Engagement
for Fixed Income Investors: Managing Risks, Enhancing Returns” (2018), online: United
Nations’ Principles for Responsible Investment <www.unpri.org/download?ac=4449>. Kris Douma,
Director of Investment Practice & Engagements, PRI, observes that “ESG issues can and do
impact fixed income investment returns. ESG risks need to be managed and addressed via
integrated research and engagement programmes” (ibid at 6).
137.  See Asset Owners Disclosure Project, “Global Climate Index 2017—Rating the
World’s Investors on Climate Related Financial Risk” (2017) at 24, online (pdf ): Asset Owners
Disclosure Project <aodproject.net/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/AODP-GLOBAL-INDEXREPORT-2017_FINAL_VIEW.pdf> [AODP, “Global Climate Index 2017”].
138.  See ibid at 24 (Table 06).
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in capital for low-carbon investments.139 AP4 measures and discloses the carbon
footprint of its portfolio every year and divests from high emitters, such as coal
companies. The fund uses low-carbon indices to measure performance and as
of 2018, twenty-two per cent of its global equity is invested in low-carbon
strategies.140
Nevertheless, as acknowledged in this paper, Canadian pension funds have
begun to recognize that climate change is not just an ethical or environmental
issue, but a material investment risk that can jeopardize the retirement security
of their plan members. The latest international rankings recognize the recent
efforts of Canadian funds to improve their climate governance and risk
management practices. In fact, the 2018 AODP Global Climate Index goes on
to mention the OTPP and CDPQ for showing the “most significant progress
relative to the 2017 ranking”.141
Despite this positive development, the Canadian pension sector has to
demonstrate significantly higher commitment and ambition to the climate
change agenda before it can be recognized as an international leader. Climate
risks have yet to be rigorously identified and assessed, and despite the supportive
rhetoric, the majority of funds have not yet aligned their portfolios with a 2°C
warming scenario. Based on a resource-driven economy, the Canadian pension
sector remains highly exposed to high-emitting sectors, and for most funds
there is no actionable plan to transition away from carbon-intensive sectors
yet.142 Although low-carbon investments are gathering momentum, they are
still a fraction of the pension sector’s balance sheets and the vast majority of
funds, with the notable exception of the CDPQ, have not established concrete
low-carbon asset allocation targets.143 These challenges are not just confined
to the pension sector, but they also mirror broader systemic problems in
139.  See AP4, “Annual Report” (2012) at 9–11, 28, online (pdf ): AP4 <https://www.ap4.
se/globalassets/dokument/rapportarkiv/2010-2014/2012/annual-report-2012.pdf>; Portfolio
Decarbonization Coalition, “CDPQ, Sarasin and SURA Join Portfolio Decarbonization
Coalition: Members Now Oversee More Than US$800 Billion in Decarbonization
Strategies” (12 December 2017), online: PDC <unepfi.org/pdc/cdpq-sarasin-and-sura-joinportfolio-decarbonization-coalition-members-now-oversee-more-than-us800-billion-indecarbonization-strategies/>.
140.  See AP4, “Sustainability and Corporate Governance Report 2017” (2018) at 9, online
(pdf ): AP4 <www.ap4.se/globalassets/dokument/rapportarkiv/2017/har-2017/sustainabilityand-corporate-governance-report-2017.pdf>.
141.  Asset Owners Disclosure Project, “Pensions in a Changing Climate” (November 2018) at
11, online: Asset Owners Disclosure Project <aodproject.net/changing-climate/>.
142.  See the text accompanying note 95.
143.  In this respect, the Expert Panel notes that corporate green revenue stands at only three
per cent in Canada and that clean energy investments trail behind most other G7 countries. See
Expert Panel, Interim Report, supra note 8 at 6.
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Canada’s climate policy. Under the Paris Agreement, Canada pledged to reduce
its annual emissions to thirty per cent below 2005 levels by 2030, initially
estimated at 513 Mt CO2e.144 To achieve this goal, a joint federal-provincial
initiative, the Pan-Canadian Framework, proposed a set of policies, including:
(1) creating a carbon pricing framework, (2) improving vehicle efficiency and
electrification, (3) improving energy efficiency, and (4) reducing methane
and hydrofluorocarbon emissions.145 Canada also developed a Mid-Century
Strategy that envisions a pathway to reduce emissions by eighty per cent from
2005 levels by 2050.146 However, despite the visible commitment to fighting
climate change, Canada continues to fall short of its emissions targets.147
Canada’s inadequate progress on implementing the Paris Agreement can be
seen from the National Inventory Reports, which are prepared and submitted
annually to the United Nations, and include estimates of Canada’s GHG
emissions.148 According to the 2018 inventory, Canada’s emissions in 2030 are
predicted to be about 592 Mt, which leaves Canada 79 Mt short of its 2030
target.149 This gap between Canada’s emissions and its pledged target has been
steadily increasing and will likely further increase in light of Ontario’s recent
144.  See Government of Canada, “Contribution”, supra note 5 at 4.
145.  See Environment and Climate Change Canada, “Pan-Canadian Framework on Clean
Growth and Climate Change: Canada’s Plan to Address Climate Change and Grow the
Economy” (2016) at 2-3, online: Government of Canada <publications.gc.ca/site/eng/9.828774/
publication.html>.
146.  See Government of Canada, “Canada’s Mid-Century Long-Term Low-Greenhouse Gas
Development Strategy” (2016) at 3, online: Government of Canada <publications.gc.ca/site/
eng/9.825953/publication.html>.
147.  A recent collaborative study by the federal and provincial Auditor General offices shows
the absence of implementation plans to achieve emission targets as well as lack of coordination
among the federal and provincial governments. See Office of the Auditor General of Canada,
Perspectives on Climate Change Action in Canada—A Collaborative Report from Auditors General
(March 2018), online: Office of the Auditor General <www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/internet/English/
parl_otp_201803_e_42883.html> [OAG Canada]. The Climate Action Tracker, a scientific
network which tracks the progress on limiting global warming in line with the Paris Agreement,
considers Canada’s climate policies “insufficient” falling in the range of 2°C–3°C warming. See
Climate Action Tracker, “Canada: Country Summary” (19 September 2019), online: Climate
Action Tracker <climateactiontracker.org/countries/canada/>.
148.  See Environment and Climate Change Canada, “Canada’s official greenhouse gas
inventory” (29 April 2019), online: Government of Canada <www.canada.ca/en/environmentclimate-change/services/climate-change/greenhouse-gas-emissions.html>.
149.  See Environment and Climate Change Canada, “Greenhouse Gas and Air Pollutant
Emissions Projections” (2018) at vi, online (pdf ): Government of Canada <publications.gc.ca/
collections/collection_2018/eccc/En1-78-2018-eng.pdf>. Please note that while the 2030 target
was initially estimated at 517 Mt, it was subsequently recalculated to 513 Mt. See ibid at 11.
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measures, including the repeal of its cap-and-trade program.150 Independent
studies of Canada’s climate policies also indicate that they will likely deliver far
less than what was hoped for by the government. A recent joint study by the
Energy Innovation and the Pembina Institute, for instance, shows that even if
the Pan-Canadian Framework is fully implemented, Canada’s emissions will
exceed the 2030 target by 160 Mt,151 which is twice the 79 Mt shortfall projected
by the government. More importantly, Canada’s climate policies are marred by
inconsistencies; the country provides the highest subsidies (per unit of GDP)
for oil and gas productions across the entire G7, and continues to approve, and
even nationalize, major hydrocarbon projects that will substantially increase the
existing level of GHG emissions.152
150.  See Barry Saxifrage, “Canada’s Climate Gap Widens Yet Again”, Canada’s National
Observer (30 January 2019), online: <www.nationalobserver.com/2019/01/30/analysis/
canadas-climate-gap-widens-yet-again>; Maura Forrest, “Canada Further from Paris
Targets Than Last Year, New Projections Show”, National Post (20 December 2018), online:
<nationalpost.com/news/politics/canada-further-from-paris-targets-than-last-year-newprojections-show>. Ontario, which accounts for almost one quarter of Canada’s total emissions,
recently repealed its cap-and-trade program as well as the province’s electric vehicle rebate,
which were funded through the cap-and-trade proceeds. See “Ontario Government Officially
Kills Cap-and-Trade Climate Plan”, CBC News (31 October 2018), online: <www.cbc.ca/news/
canada/toronto/ontario-officially-ends-cap-and-trade-1.4885872>; Daniel Tencer, “Ontario’s
Electric Car Rebate Program Cancelled So Doug Ford Can Lower Gas Prices”, Huffington
Post (12 July 2018), online: <www.huffingtonpost.ca/2018/07/12/ontario-electric-car-rebatecancelled_a_23480717/>.
151.  See Jeffrey Rissman et al, “Enhancing Canada’s Climate Commitments: Building on
the Pan-Canadian Framework” (March 2018) at 1–3, online (pdf ): Energy Innovation
<energyinnovation.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/Canada-Energy-Policy-SimulatorResearch-Note-FINAL.pdf>.
152.  See Shelagh Whitley et al, “G7 Fossil Fuel Subsidy Scorecard: Tracking the Phase-Out
of Fiscal Support and Public Finance for Oil, Gas and Coal” (June 2018) at 7, online (pdf ):
Overseas Development Institute <www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/resource-documents/12222.
pdf>. On May 29, 2018, the federal government purchased the Trans Mountain Pipeline
from Kinder Morgan for CAD 4.5 billion after the company walked away from the project.
The cost of the pipeline’s construction has been estimated at CAD 7.4 billion and despite
the incentives provided by the government no private-sector buyer has yet been found for
the project. See Canada Energy Regulator, “Trans Mountain Share and Unit Purchase
Agreement” (28 August 2019), online: Canada Energy Regulator <www.cer-rec.gc.ca/
pplctnflng/mjrpp/trnsmntnxpnsn/prchssnpsht-eng.html>; Steven Chase, Kelly Cryderman &
Jeff Lewis, “Trudeau Government to Buy Kinder Morgan’s Trans Mountain for CDN$4.5billion”, The Globe and Mail (29 May 2018), online: <www.theglobeandmail.com/politics/
article-trudeau-government-to-buy-kinder-morgans-trans-mountain-pipeline/>; Jeff Lewis &
Kelly Cryderman, “Ottawa has ‘Limited Options’ Among Field of Potential Trans Mountain
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The lack of cohesion in Canada’s climate policies, and the absence of
concrete action plans and timelines, casts a shadow over Canada’s commitment
to its Paris targets and inevitably distorts the market incentives for climate
change adaptation and mitigation.153 This was exemplified during the 2019
election campaign when the newly elected minority Liberal government made
a net zero emissions pledge by 2050 without detailing concrete steps to reach
the goal.154 Similarly, the perception that fossil fuels maintain their stronghold
in the energy sector and that the government stands ready to bail out failing
polluters contributes to moral hazard, thereby inducing market participants
to pursue short-term returns at the expense of material long-term risks.155
In other words, financial institutions, including pension funds, are unlikely
to rigorously assess and price climate risks or activate substantial capital for
sustainable projects if they do not receive a strong policy signal for a transition
to a lower carbon economy.
Introducing a strong carbon price so that it could serve as a pollution
deterrent, phasing out fossil fuel subsidies, refusing fossil fuel expansion
projects that significantly increase Canada’s emissions, and aligning market
benchmarks with 2°C and lower warming scenarios are among the reforms
that can systemically promote sustainable investment practices in the Canadian
financial system, including those ofasset owners.156 Furthermore, consultations
with pension funds on the necessary regulatory, legal, and governance conditions

Buyers”, The Globe and Mail (29 May 2018), online: <www.theglobeandmail.com/business/
industry-news/energy-and-resources/article-ottawa-has-limited-options-among-field-ofpotential-trans-mountain>.
153.  See OAG Canada, supra note 147 at 5–6.
154.  See Liberal Party of Canada, “Forward – A Real Plan for the Middle Class” (2019) at 29,
online: Liberal Party of Canada <www2.liberal.ca/our-platform/>.
155.  In this respect, Benjamin Richardson observes that while “the business case to mitigate
climate change is surely compelling over the long term, in the near term it is not necessarily so”.
In other words, financial markets are sensitive to the timing of stranding the assets and business
continues as usual if there is no prospect of for low-carbon transition in the short term. See
Richardson, supra note 106 at 339.
156.  In addition to the tensions among the federal and provincial government over the federal
carbon pricing backstop, the current price set at CAD 20/tonne of CO2e for 2019, is too
low to achieve this purpose. See Céline Bak, “Leveraging Sustainable Finance Leadership in
Canada: Opportunities to align financial policies to support clean growth and a sustainable
Canadian economy” (January 2019) at 7, online (pdf ): International Institute for Sustainable
Development <www.iisd.org/system/files/publications/leveraging-sustainable-finance-canada.
pdf>; Government of Canada, “Technical Paper: Federal Carbon Pricing Backstop” (2019)
at 6, online: Government of Canada <www.canada.ca/en/services/environment/weather/
climatechange/technical-paper-federal-carbon-pricing-backstop.html>.
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for renewable energy investments can spark greater portfolio allocation toward
renewables.157 Through the consultations, pension funds will gain clarity on
project approvals and projected timelines, eliminating the inherent level of risk
and ambiguity in renewable investments. Another important area for reform
is mandating reporting of climate-related financial information in line with
the TCFD recommendations. The meaningful disclosure of climate risks is
the prerequisite for their rigorous assessment and mitigation by pension funds
that sit at the top of the investment chain. The priority should be obtaining
disclosure through mainstream securities filings, such as the prospectus, AIF
and MD&A, which are distributed widely and undergo proper governance and
vetting channels.158 If an issuer decides that climate change does not expose it
to any material risks, it should disclose its decision and the logic behind it in
its securities filings. The significant demand from investors for disclosure on
climate change suggests that a reasonable investor deems such information to
be important.159 Consequently, a presumption needs to be established in favour
of considering climate-related financial information as material information
that needs to be disclosed in mandatory securities filings.
If these changes are implemented, stocks need to be revalued to fully account
for climate risks. Sophisticated investors price stocks using a financial net
present value analysis. The analysis requires investors to use past performance
figures (such as growth rates and expense percentages) to make predictions. The
predictions are adjusted according to forecasted risks, including climate-related
risks. As governments and regulators accept and implement environmental
reforms, climate-related risks will hold more weight. These risks will cause a
dip in the stock price of companies having operations that negatively affect
the environment. In other words, the stock prices of some companies will be
overvalued.

157.  See Expert Panel, Final Report, supra note 40 at 51.
158.  See the text accompanying notes 60–62.
159.  This demand can be clearly inferred from the overwhelming support that the TCFD
recommendations have received from the investment community. Bloomberg reports that as of
April 2018, “more than 275 companies, with a combined market capitalization of more than
US$6.6 trillion” have supported the TCFD recommendations. Included in this figure are 160
financial institutions, responsible for assets of over USD 86.2 trillion. See Bloomberg Professional
Services, “Deciphering the Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures (TCFD)” (2
May 2018), online: Bloomberg <www.bloomberg.com/professional/blog/deciphering-taskforce-climate-related-financial-disclosures-tcfd/>. See also Responsible Investment Association,
“Canadian Investors are Concerned about Climate Change, and Want to be Informed about
Responsible Investments” (2018), online: Responsible Investment Association <www.riacanada.
ca/research/2018-ria-investor-opinion-survey/>.
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There is also a need for greater clarity and guidance on pension funds’
fiduciary duty regarding climate change. This paper argues that the existing
fiduciary law requires pension funds to oversee and manage climate-related
financial risks to which their portfolios are exposed. However, as the Canadian
Expert Panel on Sustainable Finance observes, “the historical categorization
of ESG matters as non-financial has created a legacy perception among some
boards, investment committees, and advisors that weighing ESG considerations
transgresses fiduciary duty”.160 Indeed, this outdated interpretation of fiduciary
duty is not confined to boardrooms and extends to the pension sector’s
regulatory regime. The Financial Services Commission of Ontario’s (FSCO)
investment guidance provides that:
An administrator should be cautious to ensure that its
approach to incorporating ESG factors does not conflict
with its fiduciary duties, as may be the case with the use
of ethical screens. The best interests of plan beneficiaries
has traditionally been defined by the courts in terms of the
beneficiaries’ financial interests, with the result that there is
a potential conflict with investing with other goals in mind,
such as ethical or moral considerations. If the administrator
is considering such an approach, the administrator is
encouraged to consult with its legal counsel on this issue.161
Such provisions could lead to misconceptions about the legality of
considering long-term climate risks and undermine the asset owner’s incentives
to integrate climate considerations into investment decisions. Clearer legislation
and guidance can create awareness that not only is taking climate change into
consideration compatible with the fiduciary duty, but also that ignoring climate
risks would breach that duty.

Conclusion
This article aimed to shed light on the policies and practices of the largest
Canadian pension funds regarding climate change. The publicly disclosed
material studied in this article suggests that climate change is gradually escalating
from a mere environmental issue to a material investment risk warranting
systemic attention. As devastating wildfires and storms bring climate change
further into focus, pension funds come under increasing pressure to examine

160.  Expert Panel, Final Report, supra note 40 at 15.
161.  FSCO, “ESG Factors”, supra note 24 at 3.
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the financial impact of climate change on their investments. Indeed, important
work has begun to retool the governance and risk management practices to
capture and manage climate-related risks.
However, as the article’s critical perspective suggests, the rigour and the pace
of these actions fade in light of the magnitude and urgency of the challenges
posed by climate change. Canadian pension funds must therefore adopt a
more concrete pathway to align their portfolios with the goals of the Paris
Agreement. This bolder approach requires a stronger commitment by boards
to climate change adaptation and mitigation, as well as shifting to low-carbon
indices for asset allocation and performance measurement. Engagement with
investee companies and policymakers remains an important strategy to advance
alignment with the Paris Agreement. However, the pension sector needs to go
beyond engagement to transition away from high-emitting, resource-intensive
sectors whose operations are simply at odds with the remaining carbon budget.
This approach seems consistent with the duty of pensions administrators
and managers to act in the best interest of beneficiaries and safeguard their
retirement income from material long-term risks. Policymakers should remove
the misconceptions regarding the scope of fiduciary duty as ESG issues, and
particularly climate-related risks.
As the IPCC landmark report clearly indicates, the next decade is pivotal
for acting on climate change; the emissions must be cut by forty-five per cent
by 2030 if the worst impact of climate change is to be avoided.162 As the
author stressed throughout this paper, financial markets by themselves cannot
fix climate change. Market actors respond to incentives, and it remains the
responsibility of policymakers to adopt bold climate actions that could steer the
markets toward sustainability.
So far, Canada has not established a coherent incentive structure to
encourage better pricing and management of climate risks. On the contrary,
the latest intervention by the federal government, the CAD 1.72 billion bailout
package for cleaning up orphan and inactive wells, exacerbates moral hazard by
allowing market actors to privatize financial gains while socializing losses to the
Canadian public.163

162.  See IPCC, “Summary for Policymakers”, supra note 3 at 14, 17.
163.  See Department of Finance Canada, “Canada’s COVID-19 Economic Response Plan:
New Support to Protect Canadian Jobs” (last visited 13 July 2020), online: Government of
Canada <www.canada.ca/en/department-finance/news/2020/04/canadas-covid-19-economicresponse-plan-new-support-to-protect-canadian-jobs.html#Orphan_and_inactive_oil>.
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